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ARE STATE BRIDGES CONSTITUTIONAL?
A proceeding has recently been instituted in the Circuit Court
of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the
possible consequences of which are so grave, that we -take theearliest opportunity of calling to it our readers' attention. Thecase is one which involves a constitutional question which will affectin the most vital way, the interests of every State in the Union;
and is moreover likely to create an angry excitement in Pennsylvania, which may lead to collision with the Federal authority.
It isin every respect worthy of the most serious consideration." Through the machinery of this case, certain theories
uir ,of late
with regard to the central government, which have
years conspicuous prominence and development, are 1t ° oncentrated and brought to a focus. They are now setkface to face, in what
is perhaps a final struggle, with the principle of the sovereignty of
the States in their internal affairs; and if the victory remains with
them, the decision will originate the most remarkable change in the
character of our government which has occurred since the adoption
of the Constitution.
1

ARE STATE DRIDGES CONSTITUTIONAL.

The case is as follows: A citizen of New lampshire alleging
that he is engaged in a trade with the City of Philadelphia, carried
on in vessels which receive their cargoes in the Schuylkill river
at some distance from its mouth, has brought a bill in Equity
against the Penrose Ferry Bridge Company, a corporation chartered
by the State of Pennsylvania for the purpose of building a bridge
over that river; which bill asks for the removal of the bridge, now
nearly completed, on the ground that it is an obstruction to navigation ; and in the meantime prays an injunction to restrain its further
progress. The Schuylkill is a stream of considerable size, flowing
entirely within the State of Pennsylvania. For its last ten miles
it passes through the corporate limits of the City of Philadelphia,
which it then leaves to empty itself into the Delaware, upon which
the city is principally built. It separates the most important
portion of the town from the western and southern parts of the
State, and the internal trade from those quarters, and much from
the north also, must therefore of necessity pass over it; while on
the other hand, the main roads of Pennsylvania concentrate upon
its western banks. To accommodate this traffic, there are now
open five bridges, four of them railroad bridges also, below the
point to which the river is naturally navigable. Such, however,
is the increase of trade and the growth of the city, that this
number has become entirely insufficient, and at times very serious
inconvenience is suffered; so that to remedy the evil, the legislature has been obliged- to provide for the erection of several
new bridges, one of which is that which is now sought to be
restrained.
The principal, and almost the sole commerce of the river
itself, is in the coal trade. The coal is brought down from the
interior, in the barges of the Schuylkill Navigation Company, is
unloaded at wharves below the present Permanent Bridge, and there
reshipped into coasting vessels. The Penrose Ferry Bridge is a
couple of miles below this point. It is provided with a draw, and
and is some eight feet above high water. It would furnish no
obstruction to the passage of boats or barges, but would delay or
prevent the passage of coasting vessels with masts. On account of
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the injury to him in this respect, the complainant who is affected
in the last category, has asked the interference of the Court. It
is understood, however, that the Schuylkill Navigation Company,
a Pennsylvania corporation, are the real parties.
The comnplainant applied to the Court for a preliminary injunction, upon affidavits; while an answer was put in, denying the
equities of the bill. No direct legislation on the part of Congress
over the Schuylkill was shown, but it was insisted that Philadelphia,
lying on Schuylkill, had been always a port of entry, and that the
revenue officers exercised their duties on that river, which it was
argued was equivalent to a direct regulation. But the main stress
of the argument turned upon a general denial of the right of the
State to authorize in any manner, the obstruction of a navigable
stream. And this was the view of the Circuit Judge, under the
Wheeling Bridge case,X recently decided in the Supreme Court;
and he accordingly expressed his opinion at once, in favor of
granting the injunction. The District Judge, however, reserving
his opinion as lo the main question, dissented on the ground that
the point was too important a one, and that too many valuable
improvements by the States depended for their validity upon its determination, to justify the Court in settling the question upon preliminary injunction. The Court being divided, the matter rests for
the present an open one.
If this case of the Penrose Ferry Bridge were an ordinary
matter of private litigation, we should not consider ourselves justified, whatever might be its general interest or the strength of our
convictions, in obtruding an opinion on its merits at this stage of
the controversy. We are fully aware of the impropriety of a
popular discussion of legal questions while waiting adjudicatioh, as
well by journals of a legal, as of any other character, and would
scrupulously abstain from a course of such a nature. But with regard to questions of constitutional law, and especially one of such
importance as the present, we conceive it to be entirely different.
They are matters in which the people, lawyers and laymen, are
1 13 How. 518.
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most deeply interested, and upon which they are all more or less
competent to express an opinion. They affect the very foundations
of the social structure, and their determination reacts upon the future as well as the present. Over them the action of the Judiciary
is final and irrevocable, and binds posterity like a Fate. The right
of public criticism upon such subjects, therefore, to be valuable, must
be exercised freely and with a jealous promptness, and its jurisdiction cannot be abated by a plea that the matter is still before another tribunal.
Regarding the matter in this light, we believe that we shall be
guilty of no disrespect to the very able Court, before whom this
case is now pending, in submitting some arguments which convince
us that the power which it is asked to exert, is beyond its constitutional functions. We will, in so doing, simply exercise the ordinary
and undeniable right of every citizen, and shall not, we trust, be
open to the charge of attempting to anticipate judicial decision.
The question to be discussed may be stated generally, as follows:
Are the courts of the United States authorized to declare void an
act of a State legislature, with regard to the use of a public stream,
as for instance, in authorizing the erection of a bridge, in so far as
such legislation interferes in any way with its previous navigability ?
Before entering upon the investigation of the nature and principles of our government, which the determination of this question
necessarily requires, we must first establish briefly certain elementary principles of law, which underlie any discussion thereof. For
even these, in the political controversies of which it has been the
subject, have become tainted with fallacies which must be filtered
off, before we can rely upon the purity of our reasoning.
Public streams, in all countries, whether under the Roman
or the common law, have been supposed to belong to the State, and to
constitute part of the public domain held in trust for the benefit of
its citizens. The ownership of property necessarily implies the right
to determine what is its most effective and beneficial mode of employment; and, where it is held in trust, this right becomes also a
duty. As to every species of public property, therefore, the State
is vested with an absolute discretion as to the manner in which it is to
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be used; that discretion to be exercised for the benefit of its sub:jects. Thus, land over which it possesses direct dominion, may be
granted away, or sold, or if it be retained, may be employed in the
way which is deemed most advantageous. So of the indirect dominion for the purpose of making roads, which may be exercised for the
establishment of highways or turnpikes, or railroads, or on the
other hand, of vacating them again, just as the general interest demands.
The principles which apply to a State's ownership of public streams, are identical in their nature. That ownership is of the
whole stream ;-its, water and the fish it contains, its bed and the
islands which rise above the surface. These constituent elements of
the property may be applied to various uses, among which the State
is bound, as a duty to its citizens, to select the most important.
Usually this is its fitness for navigation ; but that is by no means
always the case. A common fallacy in the discussion of this question, is to assume quietly that navigability is the only characteristic
of a public stream, and to argue upon that basis. It is, however,
merely the usual test of public property, because it is assumed that
where it exists, the State cannot have parted with dominion. But
the fact of navigability, and the right of the public to navigate, are
not identical. In order to the latter, there must be superadded a
determination by the State of the special use to which the stream
is-to be applied, in the shape of a declaration that it shall be,
thenceforth, a public highway. A State may, and sometimes does,
reserve to itself the bed and fisheries of a non-navigable stream;
and on the other hand it may destroy navigability in a river belonging to its domain, in order to employ it for other ends. Thus,
it may erect a dam over a stream for the purpose of supplying a
city with water, or to reclaim valuable marsh lands and improve
the healthiness of the country. It may be necessary also to destroy
an old channel in straightening a rive', or in making a canal. So
where a river possesses valuable fisheries, the State may choose to
subordinate the navigation to them, as the more important.
But the control of the government does not rest here. There is
a habit among a certain school of politicians in this country, of con-
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fusing navigation with commerce, though the two are not at all
identical. A stream may be fitted for the former, while it is really
an obstacle to the latter. Every one is aware that in all large
countries, there are certain lines of trade as definite in their direction
as the currents of the'ocean. It often happens that a river, technically navigable, but circuitous and proceeding from a region which
is barren and destitute of trade, lies across one of these lines of
Common sense at once dictraffic, which is extremely important.
tates that it is the duty of the State to subordinate navigation to
commerce by the erection of bridges. So the mere convenience of
the inhabitants of a populous district ought to induce a legislature
to coutract the limits of navigability of a stream which passes
through that district, if no greater injury is done to trade. Nature,
in short, acts blindly, and it does not follow because a stream exists, that it is put in the best place for man's uses. And it is also
to be further observed in connection with this point, that as to the
internal trade of tl. United States, land traffic by railways is now
universally admitted to be more valuable than water traffic, since it is
much more expeditious and direct, requires less transhipment, and
is, in so far, the cheaper and better. The rude and primitive use
of nature's instruments is giving place to the employment of the
contrivances of human skill and science.
It is therefore abundantly obvious from what has been said, and
it is a pity that so simple a matter should need demonstration, that
the ownership of a State in a public stream consists in the right and
the consequent duty, to employ it, whether in, or to the exclusion of
navigation, as in its discretion it shall consider best for the public.
And this discretion is not merely argumentative, it is not merely a
right and a duty consequeat upon ownership in trust, but it is
further a necessary one, involved in the very existence of society,
and must be vested somewhere. There needs to be, for instance,
in some body in the State,- the power to supply its crowded cities
with water, to connect its different districts with each other by
bridges, to prevent pestilence from its marshes, to utilize its
valuable fisheries, and so forth. This discretionary power must
obviously belong to the sovereign, who alone, through the owner-
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ship of the public domain, has the material and physical means to
make it effective.
our own system of government, and
Now let us consider
/
see in whom the sovereignty over a public stream lying entirely
within the limits of one of the several states, is vested; that
is to say, who owns the stream and its bed ? We are precluded
from abstract inquiry on this point by an uniform series of decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States,' which declare that this
sovereignty as that over the rest of its territory, is entirely
vested in the State, subject to the constitutional authority of
Congress and the Judiciary. Our argument therefore leads us to
this, that the right and consequent duty to employ a public stream
which lies entirely within one of the States, belongs to the State
to exercise for the public benefit, subject to any constitutional reAnd this conclusion is
strictions which may exist thereon.
further shown to be correct by the tenth amendment to the constitutiou4 for the power to make bridges, dam, canals and the like for
local purposes, is neither delegated as such to the United States,
nor prohibited to the States, and is therefore reserved unto the
States.
Having thus disposed of one branch of our argument, we proceed
to examine the question as to what, if any constitutional restrictions
this State power is to be exercised under and controlled by. The
power, to repeat, is the right to determine the best use for a public
stream, and to employ it according to that use. There is obviously
among the formal prohibitions upon the States, none which bears
upon the point. The provision that "the citizens of each State
shall be entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States," has no reference to general legislation over rivers
by a State, with regard to both its own and citizens of another
State ; for it gives only equal and not superior rights to the latter.
IFor instance, Martin v.Waddell, 16 Pet. 410: Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. U. S.
In the latter case, it was said, speaking of public streams: "The United States
have no constitutional capacity to exercise munincipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or
eminent domain, within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except where it is
expressly granted," which is only as the Court proceed to show, under Art. I, Sect.
8, cl.16, with regard to the District of Columbia, &c.
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And the fact that in changing the mode of use of a stream, a State
may affect public or private rights of navigation, afects no provision
of the United States constitution, for it is well settled that the
divesting of vested rights, except where there is an actual contract
on the part of the State, is entirely within its power, and even if
prohibited by its own constitution, cannot be inquired of by courts
of the United States.'
Finding no express limitation upon State legislation over this subject, we turn next to the article establishing the federal judiciary,
to discover if in that be vested any prohibitory power over such action.
By name there is given none. Is it implied? The interference with the
use of a public stream is a nuisance at common law. The United
States, however, has, no common law jurisdiction, as has been
thoroughly established; and therefore against them there can be
no nuisance.2 The only nuisance cognizable is under the laws of the
State, and where it is expressly authorized by the State, that
question falls to the ground. The power of the federal Judiciary,
to interfere in such case, can therefore ar'se only where the act of
the State is in conflict with some exclusive power in Congress to
legislate upon the subject.
We are, therefore, brought finally to examine the powers delegated
to Congress for that implication of restriction of which we iare in
search. .Among these, we find that "to regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian tribes." This is the only one which bears in the remotest
degree on the subject, and accordingly the most violent efforts have
been made by those who desire to place in the hands of the general
government a controlling power over the internal affairs of the
States, to extort out of it a meaning which shall suit their wishes.
We hope to establish, however, that however elastic these words
may be, they cannot be made to cover the particuiar question
which we are considering.
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 540; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet.
110.
'It was admitted in the Wheeling Bridge Case that there could be no public
nuisance against the United States prior to legislation by Congress.
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We have first to determine what is the exact meaning of the
clause, and having settled that, then to ascertain how far the power
which it grants is exclusive of State legislation.
With regard to the first branch of this inquiry, we are able to
enter upon its investigation with a greater confidence in the accuracy
of the result, than is the case in most discussions upon legislative
phraseology, on account of the scrupulous care with which the
language 'of the Constitution is known to have been prepared.
During the sittings of the Convention it was subjected to the most
minute and jealous consideration, and after passing through that
ordeal, was submitted for a final revision to Mr. Gouverneur Morris,
than whom no man of his time was more precise and exact in the
use of words, or better instructed as to their true signification.' We
ought not to anticipate, therefore, much vagueness or latitude in the
use of terms, and may consider etymology a safe guide.
What, then, are we to understand by a power "to regulate commerce"? The word "commerce" is plain enough in itself; it means
trade of all kinds carried on between different States or countries.
It is equally applicable to traffic over land and to that by water,
and was so used at the time when the Constitution was framed. The
trade between France and Belgium, across their frontiers, is as
much a commerce, as that between England and this country. And
' See

Mr. Madison's letter, in Sparks' Life of Morris, vol. i, page 284.

'Commerce can also be defined as "intercourse," and to some extent it has
that signification in the Constitution. But the term only applies to intercourse
of trade, including that in passengers, when standing by itself; if used more
broadly, it is by a metaphor, which is indicated by the context. Commercium
(con and me=r) was originally a technical term of the Roman Law, signifying the
right to trade as a merchant. Andrew's Freund, sub verb. Commercium eat emendi et
vendendiinvicem Ju,: Ulpian, Fragm. Reg. tit. xix, 5. This right, as proceeding
from the Roman law of property and obligations, which properly belonged to and
could be enforced by Roman citizens alone (ji"a QuirHtium), was extended from time
to time, as a special privilege, to particular foreigners, who were then styledperegrini
quibus commercium datum eat. Certain species of property, also, which could not be
bought and sold, as temples, sepulchres, &c., were hence called res extra commercium.
In English and French, the primary signification of the word is universally in accordance with its derivation. Jacobs, "that mighty blunderbuss of law," in his dictionary, treats it as a law term, and gives it solely this meaning.
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traffic "with the Indian tribes" was in old times, as it is now, almost
exclusively by land. Navigation, therefore, as we have before
remarked, is not in itself commerce ; it is only one of the means
by, which it is carried on.
The railroads which reticulate
the country, are as truly its vehicles as the ships which swarm in
our ports. On the other hand, the term is properly referable to
external trade, and that it was used in this sense in the clause with
which we are dealing is plain, since it is commerce with foreign
nations, and among the States, which is to be the subject of regulation. We find, consequently, nothing in the word to indicate an
intention to confer upon Congress the power to interfere in the
domestic and internal affairs of the States. It has reference simply
to the relations of a State with its fellows or with foreign countries,
As to what goes within the borders of Pennsylvania, for instance,
the word is void of meaning. It has nothing to do with the building
of bridges for facilitating local intercourse, the granting out of
fisheries, the supply of towns with water, or the like; and to regulate
"commerce," therefore, does not mean to regulate such matters as
these.
As to the word "to regulate" itself, we are thrown entirely
upon its pure etymological sense, as at the time of the adoption of
the Constitution, as now in England, it had no special or technical
signification. Men spoke of "regulations of commerce," but we
believe that the verb is not specially employed in that connection
except in-this country. "To regulate" properly means, to fix or
determine the rules according to which something, or set of things,
are to act, or be carried on, or employed. It does not involve the
sense of establishing, or creating, or originating that which is regulated. It refers to things which are now or may hereafter be existing, under their own laws or modes of action, which are by this
regulation to be brought under and subordinated into some harmonious system. -We speak of regulating a clock, or the currency,
or a household, or a school, but we do not mean to imply that we
make what we regulate, or even that it belongs to us. Suppose,
for instance, the power was conferred upon the Mayor of Philadelphia "to regulate all the clocks within its limits," 've could not,
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without great violence to language, assert that this authorized the
city to set up a clock manufactory, or to compel the citizens to
,buy only its own clocks, or to prohibit any one who had a clock from
using its machinery for any other purpose, if he pleased. We could
only infer that the object Was to insure an uniformity in the standard of time throughout the city, and to authorize the use of the
usual means for that purpose.'
Now, when we speak of a power to regulate commerce, we mean,
therefore, simply a power to establish a system of regulations of
commerce, that is to say, of external trade by land or water. We
do not mean a power to establish commerce, or to determine where
it shall go to, or to make the instruments by which it is carried on.
It cannot be strained to authorize the building of ships, or the construction of railways, the laying out of roads, or the bridging of
rivers. People, in 1788, (and in the old Colonial time, to their
cost,) knew what "regulations of trade" were. They were tariffs,
' No better commentary on the meaning of this word in the Constitution, could be
found than its use in the Articles of Confederation, both in an etymological light
and from the historical connection between the instruments. In the 4th paragraph
of Article IX. of the latter, it is declared that Congress should "have the sole and
exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their
own authority, or by that of the respective States. . . . Regulating the trade
and managing all affairs with the Indians. . . . Establishing and regulating
post-offices. . . . Making rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces, and directing their operations." Here we observe that "regulation" is properly discrimlnifted from the originating or making, the managing, the
establishing, the governing and the directing anything. Again, as the land forces
under the Confederation were to be "raised, clothed, armed and equipped" by the
States, a further illustration of "regulation" is given in the article, viz., that it
may be applied by one government to what is created and furnished by another.
Further, as that which is contemplated is declared to be "sole and exclusive," it
implies that there might be "regulation" by Congress which was not exclusive,
.perse, of State regulations. Finally, by Article VL it is provided that no State
should "grant commissions to any ship or vessel of war, or letters of marque, &c.,
except . . . under such regulations as" should be established by Congress. Now,
as the power to grant letters of marque, &c., belongs only to sovereignty, it appears
that the exercise of State sovereignty over a subject is not inconsistent with a power
in Congress to regulate its action; and therefore, e converso, the power to regulate
in the one is not exclusive'of sovereignty in the other.
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and navigation laws, pilotage, quarantine and inspection laws; the
object of which was to harmonize, to protect, to encourage the
development of commerce, or to prevent certain injurious effects of
its reflex action at home. By strong implication; the regulation
of commerce may be understood to extend to the building of lighthouses, the survey of the coast and rivers, and even, perhaps, the
removal of the obstructions of navigable rivers ; though such a construction as this has been repudiated by a large body of men in
this country, including some who were the most active in the
Federal Convention. By a violent wrench of these words, and
by bringing them in connection with the power to establish postroads, a few have insisted on the authority of Congress to make
public roads as commercial highways, though this is pretty much
abandoned now. But by none has it ever been contended that the
bridging or dammin- of rivers for local purposes was a regulation
of commerce. It r ght just as well be applied to the building of a
city, or the laying c at its streets, in a State; for these may be also
the agents of commerce.
So much for the natural signification of the clause in question;
and we shall now briefly examine its history, for it has one, to discover whether that can impart to it any new and more extensive
sense.
In the discussions prior to the Revolution, the Colonies generally
admitted in Parliament the power to make "regulations of trade"
so far as external commerce was concerned, but denied to it that of
interfering, directly in their internal affairs. The right to make
bridges and dams and roads, &c., was, indeed, always exercised
exclusively by the former. This distinction was frequently taken,
both in common language and in the Colonial documents.'
IIt is not necessary to make very numerous citations to establish so common a
matter of history; the following will suffice. In the report of the Committee on
Colonial Rights to the Congress of 1765, it was contended "that there was a vast
difference between the exercise of parliamentary jurisdiction in general acts for the
amendment of the common law, or even in general regulationsof trade and commerce
throughout the empire, and the actual exercise of that jurisdiction in levying
external and internal duties and taxes on the Colonists ;" and exactly the same
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On the declaration of independence, the power to regulate trade.
fell to and became divided among the several States. We all know
how the error of the Articles of Confederation,' in omitting to vest
this power in Congress, gave rise to a jarring system, or want of
system, of discordant regulations of trade among the States; each
one striving, by duties or prohibitions, to grasp to itself commercial
advantages to the exclusion of the rest, yet all powerless against
the advantages of concentration in foreign countries, till commerce
fell paralyzed and exhausted. This mortifying history need not be
recounted here. It is sufficient to recall the fact that this state of
things was one of the chief causes for the call for a Convention to
amend the Articles of Confederation. In the resolution of the Virginia Legislature, appointing Commissioners to call the Convention
of 1786, which met at Annapolis, the object was stated to be "to
take into consideration the trade of the United States; to examine
the relative situations and trade of said States; to consider how
far an uniform system in their commercial regulations may be
necessary to their common interest and their permanent harmony;
language was used in the petition of that body to the House of Commons. The
Declaration of Rights of the Congress of 1774 elaborates and enforces the same
distinction. "The English Colonists," it was said, "are entitled to a free and
exclusive power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures . . . in all
cases of taxation and internal polity. . . . But from the necessity of the case
and a regard to the mutual interests of both countries, we cheerfully consent to the
operations of such acts of the British Parliament as are bonafide restrained to the
regulation of our external commerce; . . . excluding every idea of taxation,
internal or external." Among the private papers of the time, we need refer only to
a letter of Mr. Gouverneur Morris to 7vfr. Penn, of Philadelphia, (May 20th,
1774,) in which, explaining what he conceives to be the proper basis of continuing
the union with Great Britain, he says: "The right of regulatingtrade to be vested
in Britain, where alone is found the power of protecting it; . . . not that Britain
should lay imposts on us for the support of government, nor for its defence, nor
that she should regulate our internal police. These things affect us only. . .
But can it be said we are competent for regulating trade? The position is absurd.
. . . If Great Britain, if Ireland, if America, if all of them are to make laws of trade,
there must be a collision," &c. (Sparks' Life of Morris, vol i. p. 25.)
1 The Articles of Confederation, however, provided for the "regulation of trade"
with the Indian tribes, and in a connection which indicates the restricted sense in
which they understood it, as we have shown in a note to a previous page.
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and report to the several States such an Act relative to this great
object as will, when unanimously ratified by them, enable the
United States, in Congress, effectually to provide for the same."
"This resolution," says Mr. Madison, "met with a general acquiescence." 1 Resolutions in almost identical 'language were
adopted by Pennsylvania, Delaware, New York and New Jersey.
Though the Convention proved abortive in itself, the resolution by
which it was called indicates sufficiently what was then understood
by a power "to regulate commerce" in Congress. It was clearly
supposed to be in no way inconsistent with the Articles of Confederation, under which we know the States preserved almost
independent sovereignty. Moreover, the fact ttat such a resolution originated with "general acquiescence," in Virginia, -which
afterwards adopted the Constitution only after much debate, and
by but a small majority, because of its restriction of State rights,
is cogent proof that the words it uses were meant to grant no
authority to Congre.>. hich could by any possibility embarrass the
action of the States in their internal affairs.
We now come to the Federal Convention, and we discover from
the reports of its debates by Judge Yates and Mr. Madison, the
remarkable fact that the clause in question was introduced into and
continued from the first draft to the final revision of the enstitution, in substantially its present form, without one word of objection
from any side. It seems to have been designedly connected witlf
and grafted on the old power of Congress under the confederation, of
"regulating trade with the Indian tribes," and we have seen how
restricted the meaning of these words then was. 2 The clause also
passed Unassailed by Luther Martin, in his famous address to the
Legislature of Maryland; in the various conventions of ratification,
at least according to the reports of them in Elliott's Debates;
and in the contemporary political literature. But one objection
was any where urged, and that but faintly,-that it gave Congress
the power to create monopolies. Now, we put it to any man of
common sense and unbiassed judgment, to any student acquainted
I

adison Papers, voL. i. rage 695.

'See note, ante, page 11.
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with the state of parties in and out of the convention at. that 'time,
and informed of the jealousy with which so many regarded anything which might even remotely affect the independence of the
States; we put it to such a person, we say, whether it is possible
that men of such perspicacity and bitter animosities as the opponents
of the constitution were, could possibly have failed to perceive the
dangerous bearings of a power "to regulate commerce" given to
Congress, if it really were open to the construction which is now
attempted to force upon it. Their silence is the most convincing
evidence that no such meaning could then be honestly attributed to
the words.
And, on the other hand, we have an equal proof that the advocates of the constitution designed, as little such a result. In the
convention, the only reifiarks of any of the members bearing on the
question, which we can discover, are those which Mr. Madison
reports himself to have used on one occasion, when the question as
to the power of Congress over export and import duties was under
discussion. "The regulation of trade between State aind State" he
said, "cannot affect more than indirectly to hinder a State from
taxing its own exports, by authorizing its citizens to carry their
commodities freely into a neighboring State, which might decline
taxing export, in order to draw into its channel the trade of its
neighbors."' And equally limited in their understanding of the
bearing of the words were the authors of the Federalist. They
devote but a small space to the examination of the clause, as though
it were a matter scarcely worthy of apology; placing its defence
simply on the ground that it was necessary to prevent vexatious and
retaliatory regulations among the States, and obviously regarding it
as not extending in any important degree beyond the fulfilment of
that object.2
'Madison Papers, vol. iii, p. 1835.
2

In considering this clatise, it is said: "A very material object of this power was

the relief of the States which import and export through other States, from the
improper contributions levied upon them by the latter; were these at liberty to
regulate the trade between Statd and State, it must be foreseen that ways would be
found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their
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So far we have the obvious meaning of the words, and their historical and contemporaneous interpretation, leading to the same result. It is hardly necessary to say that this result is confirmed by
the usage of both the central and the State governments. The latter, during the past sixty years, have invariably exercised the exclusive power to develope their internal resources, the control over
their roads, and that over their public rivers. No instance of any interference of the United States exists; though the bridging and
damming of streams have gone on continuously before their eyes since
the adoption of the constitution. Nor have the United States claimed
the right to declare a navigable stream, any M ore than a common
road, within the limits of any single State, to be a public highway;
such declaration always coming from the* State.
Nor need we delay much to argue that this result is in accordance
with the fundamental theory of our government. Whatever diversity of opinion there may have been upon the development of that
theory, there never has been any question from the beginning, that it
was designed to give the Federal government supreme power over all
general matters, to which the States were incompetent or unsuited to
legislate separately; and to leave to local action and development all
internal affairs and such matters over which the States could legislate
without affecting the harmony of the whole system. Such a'system
of government is the only one which could have been accepted in
jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter, and the consumers of the former.
To those who do not view the
question through the medium of passion, or of interest, the desire of the commercial
States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their uncommercial neighbors, must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair.
The necessity of a superintending authority over the reciprocal trade of confederated
States has been illustrated by other examples, as well as our own." The writer then
proceeds to illustrate the exercise of this power in the cases respectively of the
Confederacies of Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlandsj in which, as he
observes, it was employed to compel a free passage of merchandise over the constituent States, unrestricted by tolls or duties; but as we know, never to authorize
the slightest interference in local or domestic improvements or affairs. (Federalist,
No. xlii.) No other instance of commercial regulation, except Navigation Laws,
which belong to foreign commerce, is given.
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1789, and it is even more emphatically the only one.possible in
1854. The vast expanse of our territory would make any attempt
on the part of the Federal government to establish any system of
regulations for internal application, whether conmercial or otherwise, as ridiculous as- unconstitutional. Does one man in a hundred
in Congress know anything about the nature of the domestic wants
of New Mexico, or Iowa, or Texas?
Can he say what is the best
mode of developing the resources of those States ? Can he take the
map of California, for instance, and say, "Here should be a road, and
here a bridge; this river shall be dammed to collect its golden sands;
this shall be brought over an aqueduct to supply a city with watedr;.
and this shall be left free to bear upon its bosom the white sails of
commerce?" There are few, indeed, who do not see that as regards.
at least the internal relations of the States, the only true system of'
regulations of commerce is that which simply removes all restrictions upon its free development, and leaves to the States themselves,.
who alone can be properly acquainted with their local circumstances, the determination of the channels in which it shall flow. Nor
is this a policy which is suited to our own country alone. The best
.writers on government in Europe, agree up.on its being the true and
final theory for every civilized State, except those of the smallest
territorial extent. Local self-government is viewed as the only
guard and remedy against the evils which now afflict so profoundly the whole continent; and centralization, whether bureaucratic, in the hands of a department, or .commercial, in the hands of
large trading cities, is declared to be only tyranny in disguise..
It is not for this country to prove retrograde in political science.
To conclude this part of the argument, therefore, we conceive it
to be a matter of irrefragable demonstration that the power to regulate commerce, whatever else it may exactly comprehend, certainly
does not authdrize Congress to interfere in the dev'elopment of the.
resources of any State, or to take out of her hands the disposal of
her own property; nor, in particular, to exercise for the State thediscretion, which is the chief element of such property, to determine whether her navigable streams shall be declared public highways, or dammed for sanitary or other local purposes, or bridged
2
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to facilitate the intercourse of her citizens. Assuming, therefore,
that these are matters purely of State legislation, and not of commercial regulation, we proceed now to consider how far the
power of Congress over the latter may incidentally, since it cannot
directly, affect and control the former.
There is no doubt that where a power given to Congress is exclusive over its subject matter, legislation by a State over the same
subject matter is void, and must be declared so by the judiciary.
A power may be exclusive in terms, as is the case with the legislation of Congress over the District of Columbia, dock-yards, and so
forth; or it may be so from necessary implication. This implica-tion, again, may be made from the words of the Constitution, as
with regard to the power to establish an uniform rule of natural-ization; or it may result from the nature of the object of the power,
'in cases where that object might be defeated by State legislation on
the subject matter. Now, with regard to its object, a power may
'have been vested in Congress either from convenience or necessity.
'From necessity, as where the object cannot be attained by separate
'State legislation, in which case, whether exercised or not, if the
,power be for general purposes, it is absolutely exclusive; if for spe•cial purposes, as taxation, it is exclusive so far as those purposes
-extend. From convenience, as where the object is a necessary one,
-but can be better attained by the legislation of Congress; in which
-case, till Congress acts on the subject matteri State legislation is
not only proper, but unavoidable. With regard to the last hypothe,sis, there is a further distinction to be taken between legislation by
Congress over the whole subject matter, in which case State legis"lation is entirely excluded ; and partial and incomplete action by
Congress, in which case State legislation is only affected pro tanto.
Again, a power may have several objects, and have been vested in
.Congress with reference to them, partly from convenience and
partly from necessity. One or more of its objects may be such as
-cannot be. attained by State legislation; others may be such as it is
tmore expedient to vest in Congress.
In such case it is exclusive
'before its exercise, only as to the former, and not as to the latter.
Thus, as to the naturalization laws, Congress has only prescribed
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the mode of naturalization, but its effect is left to the s6veral States.
And finally, since we have hitherto been dealing only with cases
where a power of Congress and State legislation are directed over
the same subject matter, there is a broad distinction between all
such cases, and those where though the subject matter of the one
power professedly differs from that of the other, a conflict is produced
in their independent exercise, which requires a partial subordination of State authority, in order to the harmony of the system. In
the latter class of cases, there is this most material and vital difference from the former, that whereas, when the subject matter is the
same, complete legislation by Congress actually annuls State legislation in toto; when the subject matters are different, State legislation is only affected in so far, and to such an extent, as it touches
incidentally the other subject matter. Thus, a general bankrupt law
annihilates State bankrupt laws; but a general road law of a State,
under which a road might be made to pass through a dock-yard, is
only affected to that particular extent. In these last cases, however, the power of Congress which is to be considered, is still to be
regarded as falling under one of the categories above enumerated,
and which therefore need not be repeated.
Now, as we think we have established, the power to determine in
what manner State property, and as a part thereof, its public rivers,
shall be most advantageously employed, has never been expressly,
or by implication as a regulation of commerce, granted to Congress.
Hence, as its subject matter is different from that of the power over
commerce, it falls within the final and comprehensive distinction
which has just been taken. As a general power, it is not withdrawn from the States, whether the power to regulate commerce be
exclusive or not; but will be merely limited in its exercise in so far
as it overlaps, as it were, and intrudes upon the latter. The right
and duty of a State as a matter of municipal sovereignty, to determine upon the best use of its navigablo streams, consequently cannot be controlled by the judiciary upon any general principle of
exclusion, but only, if at all, when in particular instances it inei-dentally affects commerce in a way inconsistent with Congressional
supremacy.
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In order to determine, then, the nature of this supremacy, we
proceed to consider under which of the categories of exclusion,
before considered, the power to regulate -commerce falls. In the
first place, even, admittingfor the moment, which we have denied,
that such a power comprehends the right to declare what roads or
rivers in the separate States, shall be deemed public highways, and
the right to decide in what channels, or in what directions, or by
what instruments, the reciprocal commerce of the States shall be
carried on; that right has never yet been exercised. These things
have hitherto been left to the action of individuals, and the discretion of the States. No direct conflict, therefore, can arise between
the two. A State, in the disposal of its public domain, cannot at
present cause the prostration of any bridge, or the obstruction of
any highway erected or opened under the power to regulate commerce. By the disposal of this question of fact, we are enabled to
regard the power, as, in so far, merely potential and abstract. And
since it is made exclusive neither expressly, nor by implication from
the language of the Constitution, we must expect that exclusiveness to
be involved in the objects for which it was conferred uppn Congress.
We have only to consider, according to our previous distinction,
whether it be one which has been vested in Congress from necessity,
from expediency, or from both.
Without embarrassing ourselves at present to discuss the exact
limitations of the power, which indeed we have to some degree done
before, it must be agreed that certain matters which come within
the strictest definition of a regulation of commerce, are proper subjects of State legislation, at least in the absence of that of Congress.
Thus quarantine laws, pilot laws, at least in most cases,' port
regulations, the survey and improvement of the channels of rivers,
inspection laws, the law which governs common carriers, are universally admitted to be matters of State jurisdiction, till Congress
chooses to provide a general system for one or all. They are
obviously matters upon which local legislation, until such general
I Quarantine and pilot laws in the States have been indeed expressly authorized by
Acts of Congress. But it is decided that if the power to regulate commerce be.
exclusive, it is one that cannot be delegated to the States by Congress ; and, therefore, the acts would in that view be unconstitutional and inoperative. See Cooley
vs. The Wardens, &c., 12 low. U. S. 209, 319.
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system be substituted, is proper and unavoidable, and in some cases
even of superior advantages. So far as they are concerned, therefore, the power to regulate commerce is one vested in Congress
from convenience, and not from necessity, and their existence destroys its exclusive character. The language of the Constitution
itself, indicates the necessity of such a conclusion. The States are
prohibited, unless with the consent of Congress, from laying imports
or duties on imports or exports, "except what may be absolutely
necessary for the execution of thteir inspection laws." Inspection
laws are regulations of commerce, and one exception to the supposed exclusiveness of the power, is thus recognized. On the other
hand, there is an express prohibition against laying import, export
and tonnage duties, which are also commercial regulations.' On
eN ery principle of construction, therefore, we are to conclude that
there may be some such regulations which in the'view of the framers
of the Constitution were within the authority of the States.
On the other hand, it is not to be doubted that with regard to
some of its objects, the power was intended to be entirely exclusive.
From its history, and from the explanations of the Federalist, we
know that the clause was principally designed to correct the defects
I The inference that the express prohibition of commercial regulation in one form,
implies the permission of such regulation in others, if not excluded on distinct
grounds, has been denied to be valid as regards the clause in question; because it
is said that the particular prohibition was intended only as a partial restriction of
the right of taxation, unquestionable in itself as a matter of State sovereignty, but
which, when exercised in the form of impost and tonnage duties, would be also a
regulation of commerce, and, therefore, a conflict with the power given to Congress.
But this, however plausible, does not affect the argument when stated in other
terms. The express prohibition of the legitimate exercise of State sovereignty in
one form, which also amounts to a regulation of commerce, implies the permission
of such exercise of sovereignty in other forms, though also regulations of commerce,
if not excluded on different grounds. That is to say, if taxation is expressly prohibited when it becomes a regulation of commerce, it implies that bridge building
is permitted even if it be considered as a regulation of commerce. Besides, such
reasoning is really destructive of the side on which it is urged. For if the power to
regulate commerce were of itself absolutely exclusive, it would prevent any exercise
of State sovereignty of another nature which assumed that shape, and the special
prohibition of taxation as a commercial regulation, would have been unnecessary
and absurd. See on this point, the remarks in the Federal Convention, in the Madison Papers, Vol. iii. p. 1,585.
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of the Confederacy; which, while it permitted the commercial
States, by means of the imposition of duties upon the transit of goods
over their territories, and legislation of a like character, to benefit
themselves at the expense of their neighbors, yet was at the same
time powerless to protect the Union against hostile legislation in
other countries, on account of its want of power to compel harmonious and combined action. Keeping in view, then, that these
were the evils to be remedied, we need not hesitate to admit that
any State legislation in the way of regulating commerce, which is
intended to or does in fact secure special advantages for one State
over the rest, or which would paralyze the action of Congress in
protecting our commerce against the legislation of other trading
nations, is entirely excluded. At the same time, this view of the
objects of the power authorizes us to say that the exercise of
legitimate State so,'reignty in ways which, though within a comprehensive definition of commercial regulation, do not tend to
produce either of the evils just specified, was not intended to be
prohibited, in the absence of legislation of Congress upon the same
subject matter.
Admitting, then, for the sake of argument, that the power to regulate commerce comprehends the right to declare what shall be
public highways, and what the channels, instruments or objects of
trade, we are unable to see how the exercise of State sovereignty
over such matters, over which indeed legislation of some kind is
unavoidable if Congress persists in remaining silent, could be considered as liable to produce the evils against which the Constitution
intended to guard. Where, for instance, a State which has declared
a river entirely subject to its sovereignty, to be a public highway,
subsequently revokes that declaration so far as to authorize bridges
for more important local purposes, no reasonable man can pretend
for an instant, that this action of itself will either secure to the
State wrongful commercial advantages at the expense of its neighbors, or interferfere in the remotest degree with any actual or conceivable legislation by Congress, with regard to foreign nations.
Such action of State sovereignty, therefore, is not excluded by the
power to regulate commerce.
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Now,if we arrive at this conclusion, even when we admit thtat the
matters we have just enumerated to be within the power granted to
Congress a fortissima ratione, does the conclusion hold, if our
argument that they are not included in that power, be correct. We
have shown that these matters, belonging solely to the State sovereignty, constitute a different subject matter from that of the power
of Congress, and hence, that the exercise of that sovereignty over
them is excluded, not generally, but only when in particular instances
would interfere with the Congressional power. Hence, we are
'it
not obliged to inquire even what the tendency of the State right to
bridge public streams would be if it were truly a regulation of
commerce, but only to determine with regard to each bridge that is
built, whether it tends to secure to the State illegitimate advantages
in matters of commerce, over its fellows, or whether it affects Congressional legislation as to foreign trade. How such a question
could arise with regard to a bridge built solely for local purposes,
we are unable to understand.
We have thus endeavored to show that matters of the character
which we have been' discussing, fall properly within the province of
-State legislation, and are incidental to and inseparable from territorial or municipal authority; that they are not comprehended
'within the power to regulate commerce given to Congrbss, either
according to the natural or historical interpretation of the language
of the Constitution, or upon any rational theory of its distribution
of powers between the Federal Government and the separate States;
that even if they were so comprehended, the power over commerce
would not be exclusive over them, since, in the absence of its exercise, State legislation thereon is necessary, and would not interfere with
the objects of the grant of the power to Congress; and finally, that as
they are not comprehended in, or conflicting with the Congressional
power, they necessarily remain exclusively within the control of the
States. Besides this direct line of reasoning, however, there are some
strong arguments to be drawn from the inconvenient and dangerous
consequences which would follow if we admit the position that the
Federal Judiciary is vested with power of prohibiting the exercise of
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State legislation over such matters. These we proceed to state as
briefly as possible.
The first of these consequences to which we would call attention,
is the extraordinary latitude which the construction against which
we contend, would vest in the Judiciary, to interfere and control the
internal affairs of the States. If their legislation over public streams
may be prohibited, because it would obstruct them as highways of
commerce, so may their legislation over public roads, over which its
sovereignty is equal and of the same nature. The power to regulate
commerce applies, as we have shown, to land as well as water traffic;
it affects the trade over the roads, as much as that over the
rivers leading from one State to' another. If a -State cannot
limit the navigability of a stream, neither can it improve or
vacate, or change the direction of a turnpike. In particular, if
Pennsylvania cannot affect-the destination of the Schuylkill, bebecause goods are carried on it into other Stqtes, a fortioriit cannot
control the employment of the streets of Philadelphia, which are
also public highways, and over which a commerce to other States,
of immensely greater value, daily passes; nor can it authorize
the city corporation to make municipal regulations for that purpose.
And this conclusion is not affected by any distinction
between streams, as natural, and roads, as artificial, nleans of
communication.
The banks of a river, the valleys through a
mountain range, are as much channels of trade, given by nature,
as the rivers which flow through the State.1
If the argument be correct, indeed, nothing is left in the states
to legislate over. Roads and valleys, navigable streams and city
streets, arc all tabooed. State sovereignty must henceforth retire to
the barren peaks of its mountains, there to sit like the eagles, in
solemn but very inefficacious majesty, eyeing the gradual advance
upwards of trade, and the federal judiciary.

But this melancholy

I Even in the flattest country, the best track for a road becomes marked out before
man sets to work. An old cow path, which is emphatically a natural means of
communication, -was the origin of one of the greatest of the commercial streets of
New York; what was afterwards added to make it what it is, was merely an improvement on the original plan.
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result need not really be dreaded. The conclusion, though unavoidable, if the premises be correct, is too absurd, and utterly
beside and beyond the intention of the framers of the Constitution,
to be admitted for an instant; and we may conclude, therefore,
that they did ijot hold the premises.
Again, the construction against which we contend, would withdraw from the states a most important and necessary class of
powers, without placing in the hands of the United States any
equivalent therefor. Congress has no authority to build bridges
for local purposes, or to supply towns with water, or drain marshes,
yet it is argued that the power to do these things is prohibited to a
state. The use of public streams for any purpose, but the often unimportant one of navigation, is thus annihilated, and in a manner
only parallel in the energy of another aquatic prodigy, the bands
of the states are to be paralyzed by the least contact with their
traffic by water. Now, if there be any one reasonable principle of
construction of the Constitution, it is that no exercise of sovereignty
can be deemed to be denied to the separate states, unless because it
is vested in a more effective form in the United States. The federal
convention intended a complete, thorough, and regular distribution
of legislative powers between Congress and the local governments.
It did not purpose to beget a mutilated hybrid, with the most important functions omitted. If it took away a power from the states,
it was only to transplant it into the higher sphere of federal authority, in order that it might produce better and more fruitful
results; it destroyed only by substitution. It is, therefore, a most
powerful argument against any construction, which, while it admits
in Congress no legislative authority on any particular subject matter, seeks to prohibit over it to the States, any necessary and
essential exercise of sovereignty. Nothing but the most imperative
language can compel us to such a result.
There is a final argument against the- construction in question,
which is that it would vest in the Judiciary, a power which is
primafacie inconsistent with the proper functions of that branch of
the government.
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We have insisted, several times before, that navigation by itself
is not commerce, which may be carried on across as well as upon
public streams, and may be, and indeed often is actually obstructed by the latter. Where, with relation to any public stream,
both species of commerce exist, it must not unfrequently be a
question, which is to be subordinated to the other; and one which
can be decided only by determining which of the two is the more
important. This is, however, a matter exclusively for legislative
discretion, to be exercised upon a full and fair consideration of the
interests of both. It cannot be predicated, therefore, of any particular employment by a State of a public *stream, that it is an
interference with commerce, until it be first ascertained that the
course of commerce is exclusively or principally along the stream.
Until this be settled, it might be argued with perfect propriety,
that the state action, as in the erection of bridges, was really a
facilitation of the commerce of the locality. Now, the federal
Judiciary has the power to prevent obstructions to navigation by a
State, not on the ground of public nuisance, because, as regards the
State, its legislation has put an end to that question, and because,
as regards the United States, there can be against them no
nuisance at common law; but only when they amount to an interference with commerce. But as we have seen, to determine how
far the. obstruction of a navigable stream is an interference with
commerce, requires an act of legislative discretion. Congress has
never exercised that discretion, and to place it in the hands of the
United States -Courts, would be to confer legislative functions upon
them.' The argument, therefore, which would prohibit to the States
the sovereign power of bridging its streams, must end for the present, at least, in transferring to the Judiciary the power "to regaI It is true, that in the ordinary cases of nuisance by the obstruction of a navigable stream, a State Court is not required to, and indeed, cannot counterbalance
any collateral advantages of the obstruction against its interference with the navigation. But this is because the State has previgusly declared that it shall be a
public highway, and neither.the Court nor private individuals have the right to
overrule this decision. The federal judiciary, however, when a state declares that
one of its rivers shall not be a public highway, has only the question to consider
bow far that will interfere with commerce, not how far it interferes with navigation.
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late commerce." Whether this result would be more desinible,
as a matter of, expediency, than in permitting the power temporarily to the States, it is not necessary to inquire, since whoever
has, the Judiciary unquestionfibly has not the function of legislation
on this subject.
We have now gone over the argument, which we think conclusively negatives the power of the federal judiciary to interfere with
the State control of navigable streams, at least in the absence of
any congressional exercise of the power to regulate commerce.
Having completed this task, we should have, gone on to examine
the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, upon
cognate topics, in order to justify and confirm our reasoning, or at
least to show that they contained nothing to affect its validity. But
we have already so far overstepped the limits which we had assigned
for our remarks, that we must abandon for the present that intention. In justice to ourselves, however, we must state, that while
we have endeavored to construct what we believe to be a fair and
incontrovertible argument from the language of the constitution,
and the principles of our government, we are fully aware how trite
most of the topics are, after the exhaustive and remarkable discussions by the bench and bar, during the last quarter of a century.
We must further, acknowledge that some of the positions which
have been taken, though not the more important ones, are impugned by the language of the judgments, in the famous case of
Gibbons vs. Ogden, in that of the Wheeling Bridge, and perhaps in the Passenger cases; though not by the decisions themselves.
But while we admit fully the conclusive authority of the actual
decisions of the federal Judiciary, upon cases arising under the
constitution, we cannot attribute the same supremacy to the reasoning of individual judges. Nor with whatever respect we regard in
particular the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall, clarurn et venerabile
nomen, can it be denied, that in subsequent cases the Court has
shrunk from carrying out to their lqgical result, the broad doctrines which he promulgated in some of his decisions.' We need
In the well known Blackbird Creek case, 2 Pet. 2.50, where a dam for local pur.poses was held constitutional, Judge Marshall subordinated his own logic to the
requirements of practical necessity.
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only instance Cooley vs. The Board of Wardens,' -where it was
expressly decided that State pilot laws are regulations of commerce, and that the power "to regulate commerce," in Congress,
is not in so far exclusive; and F-eazie vs. Moor,2 where it was held
that the grant by a State to a company, of the exclusive right to
navigate for a term of years a river, which they were to render
navigable, was constitutional.
Upon the same principle, we may be allowed to acquiesce entirely
in the wisdom and propriety of the decision in the Wheeling Bridge
case, which is that upon which most stress is laid in this connection,
without being unqualifiedly bound by the line of reasoning adopted
by the able judge, who delivered the opinion of the majority of the
Court. In that case the bridge which was complained of, obstructed
a river which flowed through, and was the property of several distinct States; and upon the doctrines of international law, as held
in this country, and the principles of private law, with regard to riparian owners, there was an unquestionable invasion of the proprietary
rights of the supra-riparian State. It was as much a "controversy
between two States," as to property, as any of those with regard
to boundaries and the like, which are decided by the Supreme
Court, without any regard, to the "power to regulate commerce."
To no greater extent are we bound to receive it. We feel ourselves
justified, therefore, in thinking that the discussion of the questions
arising in the case, which has been the occasion of this article, is
not estopped by any actual judicial decision. Our reasoning may
be deemed imperfect, inconclusive or erroneous, and how unsatisfactory our efforts are in comparison with the importance of the
subject we are fully aware, but it cannot be said to be precluded by
any authority before which private opinion must bend.
In conclusion, we perhaps ought to ask our readers to pardon the
undesigned length to -which our remarks have extended, but the
magnitude of the question which has occasioned them, is our obvious
excuse. It is a subject upon which every citizen ought to feel
earnestly, to think decidedly, and wheke he can do so -without presumption or disrespect, to express himself freely. Nor havewe sought
to make them the vehicle of any particular political theory. We are
1 12 How. U. S., 299., 319.

2 14 How. U. S., 568.

